, the German philosopher Gustav Teichmüller ( -) moved from his Basel chair to the much better paid chair in Tartu, and taught there until his untimely death. Besides philosophy, he had studied various disciplines, including the natural sciences. In the preparation of his own philosophy, he explored the history of philosophy for more than twenty years and made pioneering contributions to the history of concepts. Only by the earlys did he begin to elaborate his "new philosophy, " an original version of personalism, both anti-idealist and anti-materialist. He did this in three major works (Die wirkliche und die scheinbare Welt , Religionsphilosophie , Neue Grundlegung der Psychologie und Logik, posthumous ) which built upon each other. Unwritten remained the keystone of his philosophy, the Philosophie des Christentums, in which Teichmüller wanted to show that the philosophical contents of Christianity were encapsulated by his own personalism. One major objective of his philosophy, as I see it, was regaining reality-in particular the reality of the person-a er it had been lost in the wake of the failure of modern representationalism. Notwithstanding its coherentist elements, I see Teichmüller's philosophy as a precursor of direct realism. Although he fell into oblivion soon a er, his thoughts were received throughout Europe, notably by Friedrich Nietzsche, Aleksey Kozlov and Nicholas Lossky. His extensive literary remains, which are kept in Basel, remain to be explored.
she did not want to change sunny Basel for chilly Tartu. Teichmüller felt extraordinarily comfortable in Basel, too. It was money that tipped the scales for Tartu. Unlike today, at that time a professor was able to earn almost three times as much money in Tartu as in Basel. Teichmüller could not support his family in Switzerland.
e annual subsidy he had to request from his father-in-law exceeded his own Basel salary (see Schwenke , -) .
. " e most learned young man I ever saw"
Tartu was lucky with its new acquisition. e new professor was one of the most learned philosophers of his generation. Besides philosophy, he had studied numerous other disciplines with many luminaries of his time: archaeology and the Classics including Egyptian hieroglyphs, theology, historical science, political science, physics, chemistry, physiology, anatomy, pathology, geology, geography, and meteorology. His education already attracted attention in his student years. In the summer of , the twenty year-old Teichmüller went on a journey through Switzerland. Just before the ascent into the High Alps, he by chance met the then well-known and in uential Presbyterian author Samuel Irenaeus Prime from New York. ey were drawn to each other immediately and hiked while discoursing for several weeks across the High Alps from Altdorf to Geneva. Prime was deeply impressed by the erudition of his young companion. In his book Letters from Switzerland, he devoted several enthusiastic pages to the vast knowledge and inquiring mind of his interlocutor, and concluded: "He was the most learned young man I ever saw. And few old men knew half as much" (Prime , -) .
. An excellent academic teacher
But Tartu's new professor of philosophy did not only possess extraordinarily wide and profound knowledge, he was also very capable of conveying it to the students. From written testimonials we must conclude that he was an outstanding academic teacher. His auditoriums were always packed, although he used to lecture in the largest lecture hall of Tartu university. He used to speak freely, without any notes. Although his talk was very systemSee the letter of Caroline Teichmüller to her father Georg Cramer of November , , Teichmüller Nachlass Basel (herea er: Nachlass), B , printed in (Schwenke , -) . See the various lecture notebooks in Nachlass A VIII -, and (Schwenke , -) . For the following, see (Schwenke , -) . For the identi cation of Prime's character "Heinrich" with Gustav Teichmüller, see (Schwenke , -) .
atic, it was intriguing and peppered with examples from many elds. According to contemporary witnesses, Teichmüller's personal interaction with his students was fascinating. Each semester he held a "practicum, " a practical course, where everybody could ask him questions without fear that they would be ignored or ridiculed. In discussions he never exercised his professorial authority. Rudolf Kallas, an Estonian theologian, not only praised Teichmüller's capacity to respond to the level of his students, his lucidity and the simplicity of his explanations, but also his humbleness before his students. He always wanted to learn, Kallas wrote. But most impressive for Kallas was Teichmüller's joy of contact with his students, joy of their personal development.
With regard to academic achievements, Teichmüller did Tartu credit, too. He was a ground-breaking researcher and a proli c author. In his seventeen Tartu years he authored eighteen books, some of them seminal and comprehensive.
. Loneliness in Tartu
Perhaps Teichmüller was not quite as happy with Tartu as Tartu was with him. Admittedly, he did not seem to have a serious shortage of money any more, despite his huge family. Moreover, his teaching load was lighter than in Basel, so more time remained for research and writing (see Schwenke , n. ) . But it was disadvantageous that he was the only academic philosopher in Tartu. erefore, he had no interlocutor at his own level. Moreover, he certainly had many listeners, but only a few regular students of philosophy (in , only one). Only a couple of these strove for an academic career and were capable of a more profound philosophical discussion. In addition, the remoteness of Tartu cut him o from German philosophical discourse. His works were largely disregarded there. Hence, he felt quite isolated in Tartu and repeatedly tried to return to Germany (see Schwenke , -) .
. Teichmüller's theme: the reality of the person
Teichmüller's philosophical guiding theme or leitmotiv was the reality of the person, a term he uses almost interchangeably with self, individual, and soul. At the age of he wrote a treatise on the immortality of the soul See (Bobrov , -) , German translation in (Schwenke , -) , and (Lutosławski , -), reprinted in (Schwenke , -) . Letter of Rudolf Kallas to Caroline Teichmüller of June , (Nachlass B F d), partly published in (Schwenke , -) . See bibliography. See Nachlass F III .
in Plato, which he published in revised form in in his important Studien zur Geschichte der Begri e (Studies in the History of Concepts) (Teichmüller a, -). e doctrine of immortality is the best touchstone for "individual principles, " he wrote (Teichmüller a, ; all translations by H.S.). He criticised the fact that there were no individual principles in Plato, the individual being only a transient composition of general elements (Teichmüller a, -) . Teichmüller concluded that personal immortality is not compatible with Plato's scienti c philosophy. He also blamed Leibniz for equating his monads with Plato's ideas (Teichmüller a, ) . But it took thirty years until Teichmüller presented his own philosophy of the person to the academic public.
. Scrupulosity and an untimely death
Provoked by the disregard and polemical disparagement of his books, Teichmüller's later writings are full of irony and sarcasm about his philosophical opponents. One might think of him as a quite self-con dent thinker lacking in self-criticism. e reverse is true. Although his foremost goal was the development of a new philosophy, he rst studied the history of philosophy for almost three decades. He wanted to learn for his own bene t to avoid an unconscious reproduction of old ideas and to be sure to produce something really new. He dared to communicate the beginnings of his own philosophy only in some 'popular writings' . When he had sent the manuscript of Die wirkliche und die scheinbare Welt, his rst systematic masterpiece, to his publisher, Rudolf Kallas met him the next morning and found him quite aficted and agitated. When Kallas asked him for the reason, he answered: "All night I have been shaken by the fear that all the new things I have written are wrong. " His death at the age of , due to a sudden outbreak of stomach cancer, was a tragedy, for it prevented him from elaborating his philosophy in full. On his deathbed he wrote to his disciple Jakob Ohse: "When I think of my un nished works [. . . ] , I want to weep. "
. Studies in the History of Concepts
Before giving a survey of Teichmüller's works, I wish to point out that many of his writings are very demanding and complex-notwithstanding their unFor the history of this essay, see (Teichmüller , ) . See also (Teichmüller a, -) . See also (Teichmüller , , ; Teichmüller b pretentious, accessible language. My overview will therefore necessarily remain sketchy and super cial. At rst Teichmüller acquired his philosophical armamentarium from studies in Aristotle (Teichmüller a; Teichmüller b; Teichmüller ; Teichmüller ; Teichmüller ) . But already in the third volume of his Aristotelische Forschungen (Aristotelian Researches), the Geschichte des Begri s der Parusie (History of the concept of parousia), he turned towards a history of concepts. For Teichmüller, a history of concepts was the rst requirement for philosophical progress. It helps to recognise more clearly the roots of current philosophical problems and to avoid answers that have already failed (Teichmüller a, iii) .
. Egyptian roots of Greek Philosophy
In his attempts to understand the origins of philosophy, he made not only Plato and Aristotle, but also the presocratics a theme of a series of remarkable treatises (Teichmüller b, -) . It was quite uncommon that Teichmüller did not assume that philosophy started with the Greeks. He employed his knowledge of the hieroglyphs and archaeological ndings to show an at least indirect impact of Egyptian thought on early Greek philosophy (Teichmüller , -), a thesis which deviated from the prevailing opinion of his time.
. Platonism and Christianity
Teichmüller's main philosophical theme, the reality of the person, shaped his historical studies. Again and again, he discussed the relation of Platonism to Christianity. He argued that Christianity possesses a true principle of the individual, but that it has been obscured by the cloak of Hellenistic idealism.
For a detailed analysis and discussion of Teichmüller's history of concepts, see Gottfried Gabriel, "Gustav Teichmüller and the systematic signi cance of studying the history of concepts" (this volume) and Wolfgang Rother, "Gustav Teichmüllers eorie der Begrisgeschichte" (Rother ) . See also (Teichmüller b, viii; Teichmüller , xxii-xxiv and Nachlass A X , printed in (Schwenke , - (Stadnikov , n. ) . See e.g. (Teichmüller , ) : " e most important and most interesting problems of the history of the human intellect are about two events that exerted the strongest in uence on the development of mankind, Christianity and Platonism. " is might have inspired one of Teichmüller's students, Adolf von Harnack, whose slogan of the Hellenisation of Christianity became quite famous later on.
. Early sketches: monadological panpsychism, projectivism, and perspectivism
Besides his voluminous historical works, Teichmüller published some minor, popular writings which contained early dra s of his own philosophy. In his Ueber die Unsterblichkeit der Seele (On the Immortality of the Soul) of , probably his most read book, we come across a monadological panpsychism.
e real world consists of a multitude of independent psychic individuals. ere is no material world. Sensual appearances or ideas arise from the impact of one psychic being on another. e belief in the reality of a material world is caused by an unconscious projection of our sensual ideas onto the external world. is projectivism is probably partly inspired by Teichmüller's teacher in physiology, the eminent Johannes Müller.
His essay Darwinismus und Philosophie (Darwinism and Philosophy) from is dedicated to Karl-Ernst von Baer, whom Teichmüller personally knew from his Petersburg period of -. Darwinismus und Philosophie already contains Teichmüller's perspectivism, which was to explain the illusion of time and space. is illusion results from the fact that a nite individual is bound to a certain position and therefore necessarily has a perspective on the world. Before and a er, right and le do not exist in themselves but only in relation to a certain point of view. Without a certain standpoint, one would be at the same moment everywhere and therefore would not be able to measure an interval, and time and space would disappear (Teichmüller , -) . In his Ueber das Wesen der Liebe (On the essence of love) of , Teichmüller applies his perspectivism to ethics. In Lotze's Metaphysik also appeared; here Teichmüller's friend abandoned the substantiality of the person.
is was something of a shock for Teichmüller, and he apparently felt urged to elaborate and publish his own philosophy. He wrote three large books which built upon each other. e rst was, as already mentioned, . tion of the sense of being. e concept of being seems to him the most neglected question of metaphysics. e reason why this question is so important for Teichmüller lies at the core of his personalism. If psychic individuals represent actual reality and the material world is only appearance, then we cannot take the concept of being (and of substance) from the material world but only from the psychic realm. Because we have only indirect, semiotic access to other individuals, and can only infer their being (Teichmüller , ) , the only source of the notion of being is the immediate knowledge a person has of herself. Teichmüller calls the immediate access to oneself self-consciousness. e self is the paradigm, the prototype of being and substance, as he puts it in a later book (Teichmüller , -) . For him, the idea of substantiality is not taken from somewhere else, e.g. the material world, and applied to the self, but taken from our experience of the self and applied to other phenomena.
e self is no theoretical construct, but a reality with which we are intuitively acquainted. Self-consciousness is a main pillar of Teichmüller's personalism. He strictly distinguishes it from inferential self-knowledge.
Especially interesting is Teichmüller's distinction of three kinds of being. Firstly, the content of our thinking possesses ideal being (Teichmüller , -, see also , ) . Ideal being approximately corresponds to later concepts like Frege's "third realm" (see Frege ), or Popper's "World " (Popper , -) . Secondly, the acts and states of the soul or self have real being. Here the issue is not what we think or feel, but that we think or feel (Teichmüller , -) . irdly, psychic or mental acts and states always belong to someone, to a self, who thinks, senses, feels, and wants (Teichmüller , ) . is self has substantial being (Teichmüller , -, -; Teichmüller , -) . In this book, Teichmüller elaborates his relational theory of concepts as the methodological basis for his conceptual investigations. For him, the sum of concepts forms a "net" or a "map" (Teichmüller , -) in Dickopp ( ) noticed already that the beginnings of Teichmüller's and Heidegger's book were quite similar. For Teichmüller's concept of semiotic knowledge, see (Schwenke , -) . Teichmüller already used 'Semiotik' for knowledge from signs in a lecture on logics in with reference to medical diagnostics where "semiotics" was a common terminus technicus at that time (see Nachlass A I ). See also (Teichmüller , ) . See e.g. (Teichmüller , ) . See e.g. (Teichmüller , -) . An earlier, broader concept of ideal being is developed in (Teichmüller , -) . Husserl's distinction between noësis and noëma resembles to a certain extent Teichmüller's concepts of real and ideal being, respectively. For Teichmüller's relational theory of concepts, see Wolfgang Rother's elucidating article (Rother ) .
which every concept is de ned by its place and by its connections with other concepts. is "topography" (Teichmüller , ) of concepts represents the "form, " the structure of the real world (see Teichmüller , ) . In an unclear, unconscious form it exists in every human mind (Teichmüller , -) . e philosopher's task is to raise these pre-existing concepts into consciousness and to determine their true place within the whole system.
A er dealing with the real world and ontology, Teichmüller turns to the apparent world and phenomenology in the second part of the Wirkliche und scheinbare Welt. He elaborates his perspectivism in detail in order to prove that the physical world is not real. Time, space, and motion are constructs of the mind. Knowledge about them is no knowledge about the external world, but only about our own constructional activity. It is generally acknowledged that Teichmüller's former Basel colleague, Nietzsche, adopted and radicalised Teichmüller's perspectivism, though without mentioning him. It should further be mentioned that Teichmüller's operationalist arguments for a strict relativity of duration (Teichmüller , -) resemble Einstein's later re ections on the concept of simultaneousness (see e.g. Einstein , ) . Moreover, Teichmüller's strict distinction between time and duration (see Teichmüller , -) and between a subjectively experienced duration and an in nitely divisible objective duration (see e.g. Teichmüller , ) might have inspired Bergson to develop his concepts of "temps" and "durée" (see Bergson , -) . In the last chapter and in the long, substantial preface, Teichmüller obviously extends the scope of perspectivism. Now he not only considers a sensual, but a conceptual perspectivist worldview as well. He is seeking a general explanation of why most earlier philosophies missed the reality of the self. Teichmüller's diagnosis is self-oblivion: Either the previous philosophies dissolve the self into physiological, material elements or processes or they lose it in general concepts and constructs. In both cases, a certain content of consciousness-that is, a part of the ideal being-is projected onto an external world and taken for true reality. Materialist-empiricist philosophies take primarily sensory-content, idealist philosophies conceptual content, for reality. In doing so, they utterly forget the self, the real person who
Teichmüller's constructivism resembles the methodical contructivism of the Erlangen School, except for the fact that he takes not bodily but only mental actions into account. See e.g. Peter Janich: A proposition about space is no empirical judgement ("Erfahrungsurteil"), but expresses knowledge of our own actions ("Wissen über unsere Handlungen") (Janich , senses and thinks (Teichmüller , ) . e reality of the self cannot be found within the eld of ideal being. But without a self there would be no thinking, feeling, and sensing, and no ideal being at all. e book's outlook refers to the next project, the philosophy of religion. Philosophy does not discover new truths, but can only clarify the natural philosophy of mankind, like the extraction of metals from ore (Teichmüller , ) . If no singular problems but whole worldviews are in question, the ore, the material of philosophy, are the religions (Teichmüller , ) . ey contain the di erent worldviews in "unschooled form. " erefore, Teichmüller was deeply interested in the philosophical content of religions. Following this line, he wrote his largest book, the . Religionsphilosophie (Philosophy of Religion) ( ) is work is not so much a philosophy of the phenomenon of religion in general, as the title might indicate, but rather an analysis of the philosophical content of the various religions. Teichmüller not only draws on written doctrines, but also takes cults into account.
e book is an early instance of an inter-cultural philosophy of religion. Although Teichmüller favours the putative personalist content of Christianity, he argues for an absolute independence of philosophical argumentation from religious doctrine and revelation (Teichmüller , xxvii-xix) . Against a Hegelian or Darwinian history of the development of religions, Teichmüller places a systematic classi cation. He epistemologically divides the religions into three levels: the projective, the pantheist and the Christianpersonalist (Teichmüller , -) . Initially he intended to deal with all three levels, but then postponed the third level for another book. On the level of projective religion, man projects his concept of God onto the external world and thereby creates a god (Teichmüller , , ) . Religious projection is unmasked by atheism. It prepares the ground for the second level of religion, pantheism, in which god is taken back into the self. But thereby the self is displaced by god (Teichmüller , -, -) . In Pantheism, there exists no multitude of independent beings, but only god.
e book ends with an outlook on the still to be written personalist philosophy of Christianity. On this level, man as a self-dependent being faces god without perspective illusiveness and without pantheistic volatility of the self (Teichmüller , -) . However, most of the elements of Christianity have nothing to do with the personalist, third level, but belong to the rst or second level of religion: not only the belief in miracles, but also the docTeichmüller does not say much about why the self is displaced by god when the projection of god is taken back into the self.
trine of substitution which says that Jesus su ered and died as our proxy and thereby added to our merits and redeemed us (Teichmüller , -, -) . Teichmüller probably postponed the philosophy of Christianity because new problems had emerged. Like Die wirkliche und die scheinbare Welt, the Religionsphilosophie is only a snapshot of the development of Teichmüller's thought. Again a comprehensive preface presents new ideas. For the rst time he regards a strict distinction between consciousness and knowledge as the very centre of his philosophy (see Schwenke , -, -) . It seems that he began to realize more clearly that direct cognitive access to reality was not reconcilable with his own coherentist concept of knowledge. He undertook a preliminary investigation in which the nature of consciousness and its separation from knowledge was to be established. For Teichmüller, this topic belonged to psychology, for it was a question of the correct division of the functions of the soul (Teichmüller , vii) . is is one of the reasons why he named his new book the .
Neue Grundlegung der Psychologie und Logik (New Foundation of Psychology and Logics) (postumous )
Because of his untimely death, Teichmüller could not quite nish this book. It was edited by his disciple and con dant Jakob Ohse and published one year a er his death. It appears quite complete, but Teichmüller intended to revise some paragraphs and to add two more chapters. One of the main themes is the distinction between consciousness and knowledge. Furthermore, the book contains an eminent chapter on the self. erein Teichmüller refers to his philosophy as personalism for the rst time. Although it is not mentioned in the text, it is clear from the context of his work and also from his correspondence that with this book he wanted to pursue his project of a personalist philosophy of Christianity. In a letter he wrote: " e theory of consciousness which I foreshadowed [in e Philosophy of Religion] is the real scienti c road that leads to Christianity. " Because of conceptual obscurity and ambiguity, Teichmüller's central distinction of consciousness and knowledge requires careful analysis and reconstruction (see Schwenke , -) . Basically, he takes consciousness for immediate knowledge or immediate access to reality. Consciousness See the preface of Ohse in (Teichmüller , ii-iv) . e Enzyklopädie Philosophie und Wissenscha stheorie erroneously claims that "personalism" as a self-description of a philosophical position rst occurred in Renouvier in (Mittelstraß , ) . Letter of November , (Nachlass B ). e recipient was probably Bernhard Weiss ( -), professor of theology in Berlin.
constitutes an element of direct realism in his epistemology. In my view, it is a reaction to the loss of reality of modern European philosophy (Schwenke , -) . Not only the so-called external world, but also the reality of the self and its states and actions were in danger of becoming only ideas, concepts, or, as Teichmüller puts it, "ideal being. " e epistemological situation to which Teichmüller reacted shall be described in some detail below.
. Background: e failure of representationalism
In European epistemology, varieties of representationalism-according to which knowledge consists in either a pictorial or an abstract correspondence of a person's ideas (representations) with reality-prevailed. One main weakness of representationalism lies in the impossibility of checking the correspondence, i.e. determining truth and error. If the epistemic subject has no direct access to reality, but access only by mediation of representations, it can never nd out whether its representations reliably correspond to reality. Even more, the subject cannot determine whether there exists a reality beyond its representations at all. In modernity, this problem was increasingly addressed. Because one could not take the unreachable reality as the yardstick of truth, philosophers sought properties of the representations themselves which might indicate their relation to reality, such as their clarity, distinctiveness, spontaneousness, or their coherence with other representations. But this strategy had to fail, for one cannot check the reliability of certain properties of representations as a criterion of truth without already knowing reality and truth in another way. e introduction of external guarantors of the reliability of our representations, e.g. god or natural selection, only meant begging the question, because claiming knowledge about these guarantors presupposes that the problem in question has been solved already.
. Flight to idealism
It is striking that modern European epistemology abstained from a satisfying access to reality or even from reality itself rather than amending or replacing representationalism with elements of direct realism. David Hume stated without regret that one can never reach any kind of existence beyond our perceptions (Hume , I. II. ) . Immanuel Kant paved the way for a complete elimination of a reality beyond representations. In fact, he assumed things-in-themselves as an external cause of appearances (that are represenSee (Schwenke , -) for more detail and references.
tations in my sense). However, according to his own system, this was an illegal application of the category of causality. Hence, it was not surprising that external things-in-themselves were abolished by later philosophers. Only the world of representations, ideal being, remained.
. e disappearance of the real self
is is also true of the so-called internal world. Locke had applied representationalism to the inner world, too (Locke , II. I. ) . Between the epistemic subject and its thinking, sensing, and feeling, there were representations as well. Furthermore, the inner world could not be known directly.
e psychic and mental acts and states, and their bearer, vanished behind representations and nally became only ideas themselves. Man did not only loose the world, but also himself. Because there was no reference to a world beyond representations any more (Willaschek , ) , knowledge was subsequently o en seen to consist in a coherent system of representations or ideas.
. Metaphors of isolation
e isolation of the epistemic subject in modern philosophy is illustrated by the epistemic metaphors of the time. e epistemic subject was locked up in a kind of vessel or dungeon. Sociologist Norbert Elias called the man of modernity the "homo clausus" (Elias , lxi) . Teichmüller also spoke of "immured souls" when he referred to modern epistemology (Teichmüller , ) . e idea that the epistemic subject is isolated from reality not only furthered epistemological idealism, but also ontological idealism, which I take as the doctrine that there is nothing except ideas or representations (see Schwenke , -) . ch habe also demnach keine Erkenntnis von mir, wie ich bin, sondern bloß, wie ich mir selbst erscheine. " See Hume, for whom there were only "impressions and ideas, " but no self any more (Hume , I. IV. ) ; see also (Willaschek , ) . See (Schwenke , -) . Examples are Locke's cabinet or Leibniz's monad without any windows.
. Teichmüller's objective: back to reality
Teichmüller's distinction between consciousness and knowledge ranks among the epistemological attempts to regain reality. His concept of consciousness allows for direct epistemic contact with reality. But Teichmüller could only partly elude idealism. e epistemic isolation of the subject regarding the outside world was self-evident to him. e only object of consciousness is the so-called inner world: the self, its actions and states (Teichmüller , ; Teichmüller , ) , and God, who is present within the self, but not identical with it (Teichmüller , vii; Teichmüller , , ) . Immediate access to the external world is impossible (Teichmüller b, -; Teichmüller , , ) .
. Entangled with idealism
Teichmüller found it extremely di cult to introduce direct knowledge because his concept of knowledge stands within the Hegelian tradition. For him, true knowledge is always mediate and inferential. Knowledge is a conclusion, he states every now and then, and even more: knowledge is only possible within a coherent logical system (see Schwenke , -) . He therefore did not want to call immediate knowledge "knowledge, " but named it "consciousness, " or, at most, "knowledge in an improper sense of the word" (Teichmüller , ; see Schwenke , -) .
. Further development of Teichmüller's anti-idealism by Lossky
Teichmüller's anti-idealist project did not go far enough. In his view, we only have mediate knowledge of other beings, save God. In my opinion, his epistemology can at best support the belief in the existence of some other being or beings in general, but it is not able to elucidate our life-world commerce with our Umwelt and our fellow man in particular. Moreover, his purely subjectivist concept of the material world is somewhat counter-intuitive, to say the least (see Schwenke , -). However, there was a continuation of Teichmüller's anti-idealist project by Russian philosophers. With his concept of the consciousness of God, Teichmüller had opened a gap in the wall around the isolated epistemic subject. God was directly known but was not the self. e consciousness of God represented the rst step towards direct knowledge of the so-called external world, as Nicholas O. Lossky recognised. He wrote: "If you remove the partition wall, rstly, between the monad and God, and, secondly, between it and the rest of the monads, then you will derive the doctrine of intuition on the largest scale" (Lossky , -) . e rst step, the introduction of the concept of a consciousness of God, Lossky attributes to Aleksey A. Kozlov (Lossky , -) . But Kozlov had obviously adopted it from Teichmüller, unfortunately without citing him for this (see Schwenke , -and Schabad , , -) . In his intuitivism, Lossky extended the scope of consciousness, that is, of direct knowledge to everything. For Lossky, one can in principle know psychic states of other persons as if they were one's own. e sharp modern line of demarcation between the internal and the external world, between subject and object disappears. e epistemic subject is no longer trapped in a vessel, but is capable of direct contact with every part of reality. However, Lossky went too far in limiting knowledge to intuition and dismissing inferential knowledge. is precludes the possibility of scienti c knowledge, which is always inferential. But to allow for direct access to reality seems to me the only reasonable way to remedy the shortcomings of pure representationalism (see Schwenke , -) .
. Philosophy of Christianity
e philosophy of Christianity, the ultimate goal of Teichmüller's philosophy, remained unwritten (Schwenke , -) . erefore, we do not know exactly how Teichmüller wanted to show that his personalism matched the philosophical essence of Christianity. In fact, in , the Estonian theologian Eduard Tennmann published a Philosophie des Christentums (Philosophy of Christianity) from Teichmüller's literary remains (Nachlass). But this text of pages does not compensate for the unwritten book Teichmüller beweeped on his deathbed. It does not contain his new theory of consciousness, which should have constituted the foundation of the unwritten book. I believe that Tennmann's text was penned by Teichmüller's widow, Caroline Teichmüller. Her raw material was Teichmüller's manuscript of his lecture on the Philosophie des Christentums which he gave in . She transformed the sketchy notes into whole sentences and also incorporated notes of students (Nachlass A I a-c).
. Teichmüller's Nachlass in Basel
Teichmüller le extensive, important literary remains (Nachlass). Among many other things, the Nachlass comprises the manuscripts of lectures, many unpublished writings, dra s and fragments and a very extensive correspondence with many scholars from all over the world.
e fate of the Lossky especially refers to Kozlov ( ); see (Lossky , ) . Nachlass A I d. I dissent from Szyłkarski ( a, xlii-xliii) , who attributes this manuscript to a student. See (Schwenke , -) .
Nachlass was quite eventful. Soon a er the death of her husband, Caroline Teichmüller moved to Jena and took it with her. A er her death in , the Nachlass was kept by Teichmüller's eldest daughter, the composer Anna Teichmüller ( -) , who moved to a colony of artists in the Giant mountains in Silesia.
ere , the Nachlass got lost in the turmoil of the war. In , a German-Polish physician discovered it in an attic. It was completely disorganised.
e physician reported his discovery to Anna's younger sister, Hertha Brückner-Teichmüller, whose address he found amongst the papers. She was living in Basel and had become a Swiss citizen. Her husband Arthur Brückner, a son of the Tartu historian Alexander Brückner ( -), had become director of the Basel ophthalmic university clinic in . With great e orts, Hertha Brückner-Teichmüller succeeded in transferring the Nachlass from Poland to the Archives of the University Library of Basel. A er her death in the same year, the Nachlass fell into almost complete oblivion, although her family continued to live in Basel. It extends to seven and a half metres on the shelf. By means of pre-war lists, I discovered that at least the correspondence su ered some losses during World War II, but it is still a very comprehensive and signi cant collection.
. Reception and in uence
Teichmüller's works were read in many countries. As the examples of Nietzsche and Kozlov show, he was more read than cited. His reception took place in several threads that were quite isolated from each other. Teichmüller's personalism exerted its strongest in uence in Eastern Europe. It
Most of the following information has been drawn from the Document in Nachlass B* .
e most important is the Logik und Kategorienlehre (Teichmüller ), the un nished second part of Die wirkliche und die scheinbare Welt (Teichmüller ) . For a more detailed description of Teichmüller's Nachlass, see (Schwenke ) . e young Nietzsche was already familiar with Teichmüller's thoughts (see e.g. Venturelli ); he was probably also inspired by Teichmüller's approach to the history of concepts (see Tuusvuori , , ) . Apart from the aforementioned reception by Kozlov and Lossky, Teichmüller a,b,c) . It is quite striking that Teichmüller received much less attention in Germany than in some other countries.
It is also worth noting that, on the one hand, Teichmüller is quite unknown; but, on the other hand, he enjoyed remarkable esteem among scholars from various countries who had studied his works more closely. In his popular Geschichte der Philosophie (History of philosophy), Johannes Hirschberger places Teichmüller alongside Bolzano and ventures to forecast that his time is still to come (Hirschberger , ) . e aforementioned Estonian, Eduard Tennmann, opined that Teichmüller has been widely ignored "to the great detriment of science and mankind" (Tennmann , iii) . e Spaniard Julián Marías ( ) rates Teichmüller on the same level as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Dilthey. e Russian philosopher Aleksey A. Kozlov praised him as "a star of the rst magnitude within the philosophical world" (Kozlov / , ) . e eminent French historian of science and philosophy, Paul Tannery, admired Teichmüller's "puissant génie" (Tannery , ), and the Lithuanian-Polish Philosopher Vladimir Szyłkarski took Teichmüller for "one of the greatest German philosophers" (Szyłkarski / , u. ).
see (Zenkovsky , - 
. Appraisal
Be this as it may, I personally appreciate Teichmüller for choosing an excellent topic, namely the reality of the person, for being a very creative, keen and systematic thinker, for discussing problems from all sides, so that you can learn a lot from reading him, and above all, for being an enlightener in the true sense of the word. He wanted to free mankind from deep-rooted delusions. Usually enlightenment is thought to be inextricably linked with modern philosophy and science. But apart from light, modern philosophy and science have also brought forth darkness, and need to be enlightened themselves. e idealistic extinction of the individual in favour of the general, which Teichmüller so harshly criticised, has contributed to the totalitarian disasters of modern history, as Karl R. Popper ( ) pointed out in his Open Society and its Enemies. Materialistic scientism, on the other hand, is apt to lower the respect for the person as well, and does not add to the ethical progress of mankind either. In the name of science, the existence of the self is denied (see e.g. Metzinger ) and the best traits of man, love, charity, and compassion, are exposed as a hidden egoism which only serves our biological success (see e.g. Wilson ; Dawkins ) . At the end of my essay, I wish to come back to biography, to life, again. ose philosophers who decisively shaped modern epistemology, which entertains doubts concerning the existence of the external world, the existence of the self, and the possibility of contact with other beings; those philosophers were men-not women, of course-who had neither wives nor children. Teichmüller, in contrast, was married and had nine children. Moreover, he was-despite his rationalistic traits-a deeply loving person. Other persons mattered a lot to him. Both his encounter with Samuel Irenäus Prime in the High Alps and his friendship with Wilhelm Dilthey in Berlin (see Schwenke , -) bore the mark of deep a ection, almost passion. A er the death of his beloved rst wife, Anna Cramer, who died of childbed fever at the age of nineteen, he was little short of a breakdown (see Schwenke , -) . His love for the younger sister of his deceased wife was barely less intense, and they married against the strong resistance of her father. Teichmüller himself was a very responsible father to his many children. I already mentioned the joy he found in teaching and dealing with his students. For him not isolation, but love is "the metaphysical nature of all beings" (Teichmüller , ) . 
